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Abstract. Rules in logic programming encode information about mutual inter-
dependencies between literals that is not captured by any of the commonly used
semantics. This information becomes essential as soon as a program needs to be
modified or further manipulated.
We argue that, in these cases, a program should not be viewed solely as the set
of its models. Instead, it should be viewed and manipulated as the set of sets
of models of each rule inside it. With this in mind, we investigate and highlight
relations between the SE-model semantics and individual rules. We identify a
set of representatives of rule equivalence classes induced by SE-models, and so
pinpoint the exact expressivity of this semantics with respect to a single rule. We
also characterise the class of sets of SE-interpretations representable by a single
rule. Finally, we discuss the introduction of two notions of equivalence, both
stronger than strong equivalence [1] and weaker than strong update equivalence
[2], which seem more suitable whenever the dependency information found in
rules is of interest.
1 Motivation
In this paper we take a closer look at the relationship between the SE-model seman-
tics and individual rules of a logic program. We identify a set of representatives of
rule equivalence classes, which we dub canonical rules, characterise the class of sets
of SE-interpretations that are representable by a single rule, and show how the corre-
sponding canonical rules can be reconstructed from them. We believe that these results
pave the way to view and manipulate a logic program as the set of sets of SE-mod-
els of each rule inside it. This is important in situations when the set of SE-models
of the whole program fails to capture essential information encoded in individual rules
inside it, such as when the program needs to be modified or further manipulated. With
this in mind, we briefly discuss two new notions of equivalence, stronger than strong
equivalence [1] and weaker than strong update equivalence [2].
In many extensions of Answer-Set Programming, individual rules of a program are
treated as first-class citizens – apart from their prime role of encoding the answer sets
⋆ This is an extended version of the paper accepted for publication at LPNMR 2011.
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assigned to the program, they carry essential information about mutual interdependen-
cies between literals that cannot be captured by answer sets. Examples that enjoy these
characteristics include the numerous approaches that deal with dynamics of logic pro-
grams, where inconsistencies between older and newer knowledge need to be resolved
by “sacrificing” parts of an older program (such as in [3–11]). These approaches look
at subsets of logic programs in search of plausible conflict resolutions. Some of them
go even further and consider particular literals in heads and bodies of rules in order to
identify conflicts and find ways to solve them. This often leads to definitions of new no-
tions which are too syntax-dependent. At the same time, however, semantic properties
of the very same notions need to be analysed, and their syntactic basis then frequently
turns into a serious impediment.
Arguably, a more syntax-independent method for this kind of operations would be
desirable. Not only would it be theoretically more appealing, but it would also allow
for a better understanding of its properties with respect to the underlying semantics.
Moreover, such a more semantic approach could facilitate the establishment of bridges
with the area of Belief Change (see [12] for an introduction), and benefit from the many
years of research where semantic change operations on monotonic logics have been
studied, desirable properties for such operations have been identified, and constructive
definitions of operators satisfying these properties have been introduced.
However, as has repeatedly been argued in the literature [4, 13], fully semantic
methods do not seem to be appropriate for the task at hand. Though their definition
and analysis is technically possible and leads to very elegant and seemingly desirable
properties, there are a number of simple examples for which these methods fail to pro-
vide results that would be in line with basic intuitions [4]. Also, as shown in [13],
these individual problems follow a certain pattern: intuitively, any purely semantic ap-
proach to logic program updates satisfying a few very straightforward and desirable
properties cannot comply with the property of support [14, 15], which lies at the very
heart of semantics for Logic Programs. This can be demonstrated on simple programs
P = { p., q. } andQ = { p., q ← p. } which are strongly equivalent, thus indistinguish-
able from the semantic perspective, but while P does not contain any dependencies,Q
introduces a dependence of atom q upon atom p. This has far-reaching consequences,
at least with respect to important notions from the logic programming point of view,
such as that of support, which are themselves defined in syntactic rather than semantic
terms. For example, if we change our beliefs about p, and come to believe that it is false,
we may expect different beliefs regarding q, depending on whether we start form P , in
which case q would still be true, or Q, in which case q would no longer be true because
it is no longer supported.
We believe that rules indeed contain information that, to the best of our knowledge,
cannot be captured by any of the existing semantics for Logic Programs. In many situ-
ations, this information is essential for making further decisions down the line. There-
fore, any operation on logic programs that is expected to respect syntax-based properties
like support cannot operate solely on the semantic level, but rather has to look inside
the program and acknowledge rules as the atomic pieces of knowledge. At the same
time, however, rules need not be manipulated in their original form. The abstraction
provided by Logic Programming semantics such as SE-models can be used to discard
unimportant differences between the syntactic forms of rules and focus on their seman-
tic content. Thus, while a program cannot be viewed as the set of its models for reasons
described above, it can still be viewed as a set of sets of models of rules in it. Such a shift
of focus should make the approach easier to manage theoretically, while not neglecting
the importance of literal dependencies expressed in individual rules. It could also be-
come a bridge between existing approaches to rule evolution and properties as well as
operator constructions known from Belief Change, not only highlighting the differences
between them, but also clarifying why such differences arise in the first place.
However, before a deeper investigation of such an approach can begin, we do need
to know more about the relation of SE-models and individual rules. This is the aim of
this paper, where we:
– identify a set of representatives of rule equivalence classes induced by the
SE-model semantics, which we dub canonical rules;
– show how to reconstruct canonical rules from their sets of SE-models;
– based on the above, characterise the sets of SE-interpretations that are repre-
sentable by a single rule;
– reveal connections between the set of SE-models of a rule and convex sublattices
of the set of classical interpretations;
– introduce two new notions of equivalence – stronger than strong equivalence [1]
and weaker than strong update equivalence [2] – and argue that they are more
suitable when rules are to be treated as first-class citizens.
We believe that these results provide important insights into the workings of
SE-models with respect to individual rules and will serve as a toolset for manipulating
logic programs at the semantic level.
The rest of this document is structured as follows: We introduce syntax and seman-
tics of logic programs in Sect. 2 while in Sect. 3 we define the set of representatives
for rule equivalence classes and introduce transformations pinpointing the expressivity
of SE-model semantics with respect to individual rules. We also give two characterisa-
tions of the sets of SE-interpretations that are representable by a single rule. In Sect. 4
we discuss the relevance of our results and propose the two new notions of equivalence.
2 Preliminaries
We assume to be given a nonempty, finite set of propositional atoms L from which we
construct both propositional formulae and rules.
Propositional formulae are formed in the usual way from propositional atoms in L,
the logical constants⊤ an⊥, and the connectives¬,∧,∨,⊂,⊃,≡. An interpretation is
any subset of L, naturally inducing a truth assignment to all propositional formulae. If
a formula φ is true under interpretation I , we also say that I is a model of φ. The set of
all interpretations is denoted by I.
Similarly as for propositional formulae, the basic syntactic building blocks of rules
are propositional atoms from L. A negative literal is an atom preceded by ∼, denoting
default negation. A literal is either an atom or a negative literal. As a convention, double
default negation is absorbed, so that ∼∼p denotes the atom p. Given a set of literals X ,
we introduce the following notation:
X+ = { p ∈ L | p ∈ X } X− = { p ∈ L | ∼p ∈ X } ∼X = { ∼p | p ∈ X ∩ L }
Given natural numbers k, l,m, n and atoms p1, . . . , pk, q1, . . . , ql, r1, . . . , rm,
s1, . . . , sn, we say the pair of sets of literals
〈{ p1, . . . , pk,∼q1, . . . ,∼ql } , { r1, . . . , rm,∼s1, . . . ,∼sn }〉 (1)
is a rule. The first component of a rule (1) is denoted by H(r) and the second by B(r).
We say H(r) is the head of r, H(r)+ is the positive head of r, H(r)− is the negative
head of r, B(r) is the body of r, B(r)+ is the positive body of r and B(r)− is the
negative body of r. Usually, for convenience, instead of a rule r of the form (1) we
write the expression
p1; . . . ; pk;∼q1; . . . ;∼ql ← r1, . . . , rm,∼s1, . . . ,∼sn. (2)
or, alternatively, H(r)+;∼H(r)− ← B(r)+,∼B(r)−. A rule is called positive if its
head and body contain only atoms. A program is any set of rules.
We also introduce the following non-standard notion which we will need throughout
the rest of the paper:
Definition 1 (Canonical Tautology). Let pε be an arbitrary but fixed atom. The canon-
ical tautology, denoted by ε, is the rule pε ← pε.
In the following, we define two semantics for rules. One is that of classical models,
where a rule is simply treated as a classical implication. The other is based on the logic
of Here-and-There [16, 17], more accurately on a reformulation of the here-and-there
semantics, called SE-model semantics, defined for rules [18]. This second semantics is
strictly more expressive than both classical models and the stable model semantics [19].
C-Models. We introduce the classical model of a rule by translating the rule into
a propositional formula: Given a rule r of the form (2), we define the propositional
formula r as
∨
{ p1, . . . , pk,¬q1, . . . ,¬ql } ⊂
∧
{ r1, . . . , rm,¬s1, . . . ,¬sn }. Note
that
∨
∅ ≡ ⊥ and
∧
∅ ≡ ⊤. A classical model, or C-model, of a rule r is any model of
the formula r. The set of all C-models of a rule r is denoted by modC (r).
We say a rule r is a C-tautology, or C-tautological, if modC (r) = I. Otherwise, r
is non-C-tautological. We say two rules r, r′ are C-equivalent if they have the same set
of C-models. Note that the canonical tautology ε (c.f. Definition 1) is C-tautological.
SE-Models. Given a rule r and an interpretation J , we define the reduct of r relative to
J , denoted by rJ , as follows: If some atom from H(r)− is false under J or some atom
from B(r)− is true under J , then rJ is ε; otherwise rJ is H(r)+ ← B(r)+. Intuitively,
the reduct rJ is the positive part of a rule r that “remains” after all its negative literals are
interpreted under interpretation J . The two conditions in the definition check whether
the rule is satisfied based on the negative atoms in its head and body, interpreted under
J . If this is the case, the reduct is by definition the canonical tautology. If none of
these conditions is satisfied, the positive parts of r are kept in the reduct, discarding the
negative ones.
An SE-interpretation is a pair of interpretations 〈I, J〉 such that I is a subset of J .
The set of all SE-interpretations is denoted by ISE. We say that an SE-interpretation
〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of a rule r if J is a C-model of r and I is a C-model of rJ .
The set of all SE-models of a rule r is denoted by modSE (r). The SE-models of a
program P are the SE-models of all rules in P . A set of SE-interpretations S is called
rule-representable if there exists a rule r such that S = modSE (r).
We say that a rule r is SE-tautological if modSE (r) = ISE. Note that the canonical
tautology ε (c.f. Definition 1) is SE-tautological. We say that two rules r, r′ are strongly
equivalent, or SE-equivalent, if they have the same set of SE-models.
3 Rule Equivalence Classes and their Canonical Rules
Our goal is to find useful insights into the inner workings of the SE-model semantics
with respect to single rules. In order to do so, we first introduce a set of representatives
of rule equivalence classes induced by SE-models and show how the representative of a
class can be constructed given one of its members. Then we show how to reconstruct a
representative from the set of its SE-models. Finally, we pinpoint the conditions under
which a set of SE-interpretations is rule-representable.
3.1 Canonical Rules
We start by bringing out simple but powerful transformations that simplify a given rule
while preserving its SE-models. Most of these results have already been formulated in
various ways [20, 2, 21]. The following result summarises the conditions under which a
rule is SE-tautological:
Lemma 2 (Consequence of Theorem 4.4 in [2]; part i) of Lemma 2 in [21]). Let H
and B be sets of literals and p be an atom. Then a rule is SE-tautological if it takes any
of the following forms:
p;H ← p,B. H ;∼p← B,∼p. H ← B, p,∼p.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 16. ⊓⊔
Thus, repeating an atom in different “components” of the rule frequently causes the rule
to be SE-tautological. In particular, this happens if the same atom occurs in the positive
head and positive body, or in the negative head and negative body, or in the positive and
negative bodies of a rule. How about the cases when the head contains a negation of a
literal from the body? The following Lemma clarifies this situation:
Lemma 3 (Consequence of (3) and (4) in Lemma 1 in [21]). Let H and B be sets of
literals and L be a literal. Then rules of the following forms are SE-equivalent:
H ;∼L← L,B. H ← L,B. (3)
Proof. See Appendix A, page 17. ⊓⊔
So if a literal is present in the body of a rule, its negation can be removed from the head.
Until now we have seen that a rule r that has a common atom in at least two of the
sets H(r)+∪H(r)−, B(r)+ andB(r)− is either SE-tautological, or SE-equivalent to a
rule where the atom is omitted from the rule’s head. So such a rule is always SE-equiv-
alent either to the canonical tautology ε, or to a rule without such repetitions. Perhaps
surprisingly, repetitions in positive and negative head cannot be simplified away. For
example, over the alphabet Lp = { p }, the rule “p;∼p← .” has two SE-models, 〈∅, ∅〉
and 〈{ p } , { p }〉, so it is not SE-tautological, nor is it SE-equivalent to any of the facts
“p.” and “∼p.”. Actually, it is not very difficult to see that it is not SE-equivalent to
any other rule, even over larger alphabets. So the fact that an atom is in both H(r)+
and H(r)− cannot all by itself imply that some kind of SE-models preserving rule
simplification is possible.
The final Lemma reveals a special case in which we can eliminate the whole nega-
tive head of a rule and move it to its positive body. This occurs whenever the positive
head is empty.
Lemma 4 (Related to Corollary 4.10 in [20] and Corollary 1 in [21]). Let H− be
a set of negative literals, B be a set of literals and p be an atom. Then rules of the
following forms are SE-equivalent:
∼p;H− ← B. H− ← p,B.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 17. ⊓⊔
Armed with the above results, we can introduce the notion of a canonical rule.
Each such rule represents a different equivalence class on the set of all rules induced
by the SE-model semantics. In other words, every rule is SE-equivalent to exactly
one canonical rule. After the definition, we provide constructive transformations which
show that this is indeed the case. Note that the definition can be derived directly from
the Lemmas above:
Definition 5 (Canonical Rule). We say a rule r is canonical if either it is ε, or the
following conditions are satisfied:
1. The sets H(r)+ ∪H(r)−, B(r)+ and B(r)− are pairwise disjoint.
2. If H(r)+ is empty, then H(r)− is also empty.
This definition is closely related with the notion of a fundamental rule introduced
in Definition 1 of [21]. There are two differences between canonical and fundamental
rules: (1) a fundamental rule must satisfy condition 1. above, but need not satisfy con-
dition 2.; (2) no SE-tautological rule is fundamental. As a consequence, fundamental
rules do not cover all rule-representable sets of SE-interpretations, and two distinct fun-
damental rules may still be SE-equivalent. From the point of view of rule equivalence
classes induced by SE-model semantics, there is one class that contains no fundamen-
tal rule, and some classes contain more than one fundamental rule. In the following we
show that canonical rules overcome both of these limitations of fundamental rules. In
other words, every rule is SE-equivalent to exactly one canonical rule. To this end, we
define constructive transformations that directly show the mutual relations between rule
syntax and semantics.
The following transformation provides a direct way of constructing a canonical rule
that is SE-equivalent to a given rule r.
Definition 6 (Transformation into a Canonical Rule). Given a rule r, by can(r) we
denote a canonical rule constructed as follows: If any of the sets H(r)+ ∩ B(r)+,
H(r)− ∩B(r)− and B(r)+ ∩B(r)− is nonempty, then can(r) is ε. Otherwise, can(r)
is of the form H+;∼H− ← B+,∼B−. where
– H+ = H(r)+ \B(r)−.
– If H+ is empty, then H− = ∅ and B+ = B(r)+ ∪H(r)−.
– If H+ is nonempty, then H− = H(r)− \B(r)+ and B+ = B(r)+.
– B− = B(r)−.
Correctness of the transformation follows directly from Lemmas 2 to 4.
Theorem 7. Every rule r is SE-equivalent to the canonical rule can(r).
Proof. See Appendix A, page 18. ⊓⊔
What remains to be proven is that no two different canonical rules are SE-equiv-
alent. In the next Subsection we show how every canonical rule can be reconstructed
from the set of its SE-models. As a consequence, no two different canonical rules can
have the same set of SE-models.
3.2 Reconstructing Rules
In order to reconstruct a rule r from the set S of its SE-models, we need to understand
how exactly each literal in the rule influences its models. The following Lemma pro-
vides a useful characterisation of the set of countermodels of a rule in terms of syntax:
Lemma 8 (Different formulation of Theorem 4 in [21]). Let r be a rule. An SE-in-
terpretation 〈I, J〉 is not an SE-model of r if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied:
1. H(r)− ∪B(r)+ ⊆ J and J ⊆ L \B(r)−.
2. Either J ⊆ L \H(r)+ or both B(r)+ ⊆ I and I ⊆ L \H(r)+.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 18. ⊓⊔
The first condition together with the first disjunct of the second condition hold if
and only if J is not a C-model of r. The second disjunct then captures the case when I
is not a C-model of rJ .
If we take a closer look at these conditions, we find that the presence of a negative
body atom in J guarantees that the first condition is falsified, so 〈I, J〉 is a model of
r, regardless of the content of I . Somewhat similar is the situation with positive head
atoms – whenever such an atom is present in I , it is also present in J , so the second
condition is falsified and 〈I, J〉 is a model of r. Thus, if S is the set of SE-models of a
rule r, then every atom p ∈ B(r)− satisfies
p ∈ J implies 〈I, J〉 ∈ S (CB−)
and every atom p ∈ H(r)+ satisfies
p ∈ I implies 〈I, J〉 ∈ S . (CH+ )
If we restrict ourselves to canonical rules different from ε, we find that these conditions
are not only necessary, but, when combined properly, also sufficient to decide what
atoms belong to the negative body and positive head of the rule.
For the rest of this Subsection, we assume that r is a canonical rule different from
ε and S is the set of SE-models of r. Keeping in mind that every atom that satisfies
condition (CB−) also satisfies condition (CH+ ) (because I is a subset of J), and that
B(r)− is by definition disjoint from H(r)+, we arrive at the following results:
Lemma 9. An atom p belongs toB(r)− if and only if for all 〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE, the condition
(CB−) is satisfied. An atom p belongs to H(r)+ if and only if it does not belong to
B(r)− and for all 〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE, the condition (CH+ ) is satisfied.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 19. ⊓⊔
As can be seen from Lemma 8, the role of positive body and negative head atoms
is dual to that of negative body and positive head atoms. Intuitively, their absence in
J , and sometimes also in I , implies that 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r. It follows from
the first condition of Lemma 8 that if p belongs to H(r)− ∪B(r)+, then the following
condition is satisfied:
p /∈ J implies 〈I, J〉 ∈ S . (CH− )
Furthermore, the second condition in Lemma 8 implies that every p ∈ B(r)+ satisfies
the following condition:
p /∈ I and J ∩H(r)+ 6= ∅ implies 〈I, J〉 ∈ S . (CB+ )
These observations lead to the following results:
Lemma 10. An atom p belongs to B(r)+ if and only if for all 〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE, the condi-
tions (CH− ) and (CB+ ) are satisfied. An atom p belongs to H(r)− if and only if it does
not belong to B(r)+ and for all 〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE, the condition (CH− ) is satisfied.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 21. ⊓⊔
Together, the two Lemmas above are sufficient to reconstruct a canonical rule from
its set of SE-models. The following definition sums up these results by introducing the
notion of a rule induced by a set of SE-interpretations:
Definition 11 (Rule Induced by a Set of SE-Interpretations).
Let S be a set of SE-interpretations.
An atom p is called an S-negative-body atom if every SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉 with
p ∈ J belongs to S. An atom p is called an S-positive-head atom if it is not an S-nega-
tive-body atom and every SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉 with p ∈ I belongs to S.
An atom p is called an S-positive-body atom if every SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉 with
p /∈ J belongs to S, and every SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉 with p /∈ I and J containing
some S-positive-head atom also belongs to S. An atom p is called an S-negative-head
atom if it is not an S-positive-body atom and every SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉 with p /∈ J
belongs to S.
The sets of all S-negative-body, S-positive-head, S-positive-body and S-nega-
tive-head atoms are denoted by B(S)−, H(S)+, B(S)+ and H(S)−, respectively. The
rule induced by S, denoted by rule(S), is defined as follows: If S = ISE, then rule(S)
is ε; otherwise, rule(S) is of the form
H(S)+;∼H(S)− ← B(S)+,∼B(S)−.
The main property of induced rules is that every canonical rule is induced by its
own set of SE-models and can thus be “reconstructed” from its set of SE-models. This
follows directly from Definition 11 and Lemmas 9 and 10.
Theorem 12. For every canonical rule r, rule(modSE (r)) = r.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 21. ⊓⊔
This result, together with Theorem 7, has a number of consequences. First, for any
rule r, the canonical rule can(r) is induced by the set of SE-models of r.
Corollary 13. For every rule r, rule(modSE (r)) = can(r).
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 7 and Theorem 12. ⊓⊔
Furthermore, Theorem 12 directly implies that for two different canonical rules
r1, r2 we have rule(modSE (r1)) = r1 and rule(modSE (r2)) = r2, so modSE (r1) and
modSE (r2) must differ.
Corollary 14. No two different canonical rules are SE-equivalent.
Proof. Follows directly from the Theorem 12. ⊓⊔
Finally, the previous Corollary together with Theorem 7 imply that for every rule
there not only exists an SE-equivalent canonical rule, but this rule is also unique.
Corollary 15. Every rule is SE-equivalent to exactly one canonical rule.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 7 and Corollary 14. ⊓⊔
3.3 Sets of SE-Interpretations Representable by a Rule
Naturally, not all sets of SE-interpretations correspond to a single rule, otherwise any
program could be reduced to a single rule. The conditions under which a set of SE-in-
terpretations is rule-representable are worth examining.
A set of SE-models S of a program is always well-defined, i.e. whenever S contains
〈I, J〉, it also contains 〈J, J〉. Moreover, for every well-defined set of SE-interpreta-
tions S there exists a program P such that S = modSE (P) [10].
We offer two approaches to find a similar condition for the class of rule-
representable sets of SE-interpretations. The first is based on induced rules defined in
the previous Subsection, while the second is formulated using lattice theory and is a
consequence of Lemma 8.
The first characterisation follows from two properties of the rule(·) transformation.
First, it can be applied to any set of SE-interpretations, even those that are not rule-
representable. Second, if rule(S) = r, then it holds that modSE (r) is a subset of S.
Lemma 16. The set of all SE-models of a canonical rule r is the least among all sets
of SE-interpretations S such that rule(S) = r.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 22. ⊓⊔
Thus, to verify that S is rule-representable, it suffices to check that all interpretations
from S are models of rule(S).
The second characterisation follows from Lemma 8 which tells us that if S is rule-
representable, then its complement consists of SE-interpretations 〈I, J〉 following a
certain pattern. Their second component J always contains a fixed set of atoms and is
itself contained in another fixed set of atoms. Their first component I satisfies a similar
property, but only if a certain further condition is satisfied by J . More formally, for the
sets
I⊥ = B(r)+, I⊤ = L \H(r)+, J⊥ = H(r)− ∪B(r)+, J⊤ = L \B(r)−,
it holds that all SE-interpretations from the complement of S are of the form 〈I, J〉
where J⊥ ⊆ J ⊆ J⊤ and either J ⊆ I⊤ or I⊥ ⊆ I ⊆ I⊤. It turns out that this
also holds vice versa: if the complement of S satisfies the above property, then S is
rule-representable. Furthermore, to accentuate the particular structure that arises, we
can substitute the condition J⊥ ⊆ J ⊆ J⊤ with saying that J belongs to a convex
sublattice of I.1 A similar substitution can be performed for I , yielding:
Theorem 17. Let S be a set of SE-interpretations. Then the following conditions are
equivalent:
1. The set of SE-interpretations S is rule-representable.
2. All SE-interpretations from S are SE-models of rule(S).
1 A sublattice L of L′ is convex if c ∈ L whenever a, b ∈ L and a ≤ c ≤ b holds in L′. For
more details see e.g. [22].
3. There exist convex sublattices L1, L2 of 〈I,⊆〉 such that the complement of S rel-
ative to ISE is equal to
{
〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE
∣∣ I ∈ L1 ∧ J ∈ L2
}
∪
{
〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE
∣∣ J ∈ L1 ∩ L2
}
.
Proof. See Appendix A, page 24. ⊓⊔
4 Discussion
The presented results mainly serve to facilitate the transition back and forth between
a rule and the set of its SE-models. They also make it possible to identify when a
given set of SE-models is representable by a single rule. We believe that in situations
where information on literal dependencies, expressed in individual rules, is essential
for defining operations on logic programs, the advantages of dealing with rules on the
level of semantics instead of on the level of syntax are significant. The semantic view
takes care of stripping away unnecessary details and since the introduced notions and
operators are defined in terms of semantic objects, it should be much easier to introduce
and prove their semantic properties.
These results can be used for example in the context of program updates to define an
update semantics based on the rule rejection principle [4] and operating on sets of sets
of SE-models. Such a semantics can serve as a bridge between syntax-based approaches
to rule updates, and the principles and semantic distance measures known from the area
of Belief Change. The next steps towards such a semantics involve a definition of the
notion of support for a literal by a set of SE-models (of a rule). Such a notion can then
foster a better understanding of desirable properties for semantic rule update operators.
On a different note, viewing a logic program as the set of sets of SE-models of rules
inside it leads naturally to the introduction of the following new notion of program
equivalence:
Definition 18 (Strong Rule Equivalence). Programs P1,P2 are SR-equivalent, de-
noted by P1 ≡SR P2, if
{modSE (r) | r ∈ P1 ∪ { ε } } = {modSE (r) | r ∈ P2 ∪ { ε } } .
Thus, two programs are SR-equivalent if they contain the same rules, modulo the
SE-model semantics. We add ε to each of the two programs in the definition so that
presence or absence of tautological rules in a program does not influence program
equivalence. SR-equivalence is stronger than strong equivalence, in the following
sense:
Definition 19 (Strength of Program Equivalence). Let ≡1,≡2 be equivalence rela-
tions on the set of all programs. We say that ≡1 is at least as strong as ≡2, denoted by
≡1≡2, if P1 ≡1 P2 implies P1 ≡2 P2 for all programs P1,P2. We say that ≡1 is
stronger than ≡2, denoted by ≡1≻≡2, if ≡1≡2 but not ≡2≡1.
Thus, using the notation of the above definition, we can write ≡SR≻≡S, where ≡S
denotes the relation of strong equivalence. An example of programs that are strongly
equivalent, but not SR-equivalent is P = { p., q. } and Q = { p., q ← p. }, which in
many cases need to be distinguished from one another. We believe that this notion of
program equivalence is much more suitable for cases when the dependency information
contained in a program is of importance.
In certain cases, however, SR-equivalence may be too strong. For instance, it may
be desirable to treat programs such as P1 = { p← q. } and P2 = { p← q., p← q, r. }
in the same way because the extra rule in P2 is just a weakened version of the rule inP1.
For instance, the notion of update equivalence introduced in [23], which is based on a
particular approach to logic program updates, considers programs P1 and P2 as equiv-
alent because the extra rule in P2 cannot influence the result of any subsequent updates.
Since these programs are not SR-equivalent, we also introduce the following notion of
program equivalence, which in terms of strength falls between strong equivalence and
SR-equivalence.
Definition 20 (Strong Minimal Rule Equivalence). ProgramsP1,P2 are SMR-equiv-
alent, denoted by P1 ≡SMR P2, if
min {modSE (r) | r ∈ P1 ∪ { ε } } = min {modSE (r) | r ∈ P2 ∪ { ε } } ,
where minS denotes the set of subset-minimal elements of S.
In order for programs to be SMR-equivalent, they need not contain exactly the
same rules (modulo strong equivalence), it suffices if rules with subset-minimal sets of
SE-models are the same (again, modulo strong equivalence). Certain programs, such
as P1 and P2 above, are not SR-equivalent but they are still SMR-equivalent.
Related to this is the very strong notion of equivalence which was introduced in [2]:
Definition 21 (Strong Update Equivalence, c.f. Definition 4.1 in [2]). Two programs
P1, P1 are SU-equivalent, denoted by P1 ≡SU P2, if for any programs Q, R it holds
that the program ((P1\Q)∪R) has the same answer sets as the program ((P2\Q)∪R).
Two programs are strongly update equivalent only under very strict conditions –
it is shown in [2] that two programs are SU-equivalent if and only if their symmetric
difference contains only SE-tautological rules. This means that programs such asQ1 =
{∼p. }, Q2 = {← p. } and Q3 = {∼p← p. } are considered to be mutually non-
equivalent, even though the rules they contain are mutually SE-equivalent. This may be
seen as too sensitive to rule syntax.
The following result formally establishes the relations between the discussed no-
tions of program equivalence:
Theorem 22. SU-equivalence is stronger than SR-equivalence, which itself is
stronger than SMR-equivalence, which in turn is stronger than strong equivalence.
That is,
≡SU≻≡SR≻≡SMR≻≡S .
Proof. See Appendix A, page 24. ⊓⊔
The other notion of program equivalence introduced in [2], strong update equiva-
lence on common rules, or SUC-equivalence, is incomparable in terms of strength to
our new notions of equivalence. On the one hand, SR- and SMR-equivalent programs
such as {∼p. } and {∼p.,← p. } are not SUC-equivalent. On the other hand, programs
such as { p., q ← p. } and { q., p← q. } are neither SR- nor SMR-equivalent, but they
are SUC-equivalent. We believe that both of these examples are more appropriately
treated by the new notions of equivalence.
The introduction of canonical rules, which form a set of representatives of rule
equivalence classes induced by SE-models, also reveals the exact expressivity of
SE-model semantics with respect to a single rule. From their definition we can see that
SE-models are capable of distinguishing between any pair of rules, except for (1) a pair
of rules that only differ in the number of repetitions of literals in their heads and bodies;
(2) an integrity constraint and a rule whose head only contains negative literals. We
believe that in the former case, there is little reason to distinguish between such rules
and so the transition from rules to their SE-models has the positive effect of stripping
away of unnecessary details. However, the latter case has more serious consequences.
Although rules such as
∼p← q. and ← p, q.
are usually considered to carry the same meaning, some existing work suggests that they
should be treated differently – while the former rule gives a reason for atom p to become
false whenever q is true, the latter rule simply states that the two atoms cannot be true
at the same time, without specifying a way to resolve this situation if it were to arise [4,
8]. If we view a rule through the set of its SE-models, we cannot distinguish these two
kinds of rules anymore. Whenever this is important, either strong update equivalence is
used, which is perhaps too sensitive to the syntax of rules, or a new characterisation of
Answer-Set Programming needs to be discovered, namely one that is not based on the
logic of Here-and-There [16, 17].
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A Proofs
Lemma 2. Let H and B be sets of literals and p be an atom. Then a rule is SE-tauto-
logical if it takes any of the following forms:
p;H ← p,B. H ;∼p← B,∼p. H ← B, p,∼p.
Proof. First assume that rule r is of the first form. We need to show that any SE-in-
terpretation is an SE-model of r. Suppose 〈I, J〉 is some SE-interpretation. Rule r is
C-tautological, so J is a C-model of r. Furthermore, rJ is either ε, or it inherits p in
both its head and body from r. In any case, r is C-tautological, so I is a C-model of rJ .
Consequently, 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r.
Now suppose r is of the second form. As before, given an SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉,
we see that J is a C-model of r because r is C-tautological. Furthermore, rJ will
necessarily end up being equal to ε because of the atom p common to H(r)− and
B(r)−, regardless of how J interprets p. So I is a C-model of rJ , and, consequently,
〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r.
Finally, suppose r takes the third form and take an SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉. Rule r
can again easily be verified to be C-tautological, so J is a C-model of r. If all atoms
fromB(r)− are false under J , then rJ contains the atom p in its body that is false under
J , thus also false under I since I is a subset of J . Consequently, I is a C-model of rJ .
On the other hand, if at least one of atoms from B(r)− is true under J , then rJ is equal
to ε, so again, I is a C-model of rJ . Consequently, 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r. ⊓⊔
Lemma 23. Let H and B be sets of literals and p be an atom. Then rules of the follow-
ing forms are SE-equivalent:
p;H ← B,∼p. H ← B,∼p.
Proof. Let the first rule be denoted by r1 and the second by r2 and suppose 〈I, J〉 is an
SE-interpretation. We will show that 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r1 if and only if it is an
SE-model of r2. We can easily see that rules r1, r2 are C-equivalent. So J is either not
a C-model of any of them or it is a C-model of both of them. In the former case, 〈I, J〉
is not an SE-model of any of the two rules and we are finished. In the latter case, we
need to distinguish two cases:
a) If J is a not a model of the bodies of r1 and r2 (the bodies are identical), then either
rJ1 and rJ2 are equal to ε, or they contain an atom in their bodies that is false under
J , thus also false under I because I is a subset of J . In any case, I is a C-model of
both rJ1 and rJ2 , so 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of both r1 and r2.
b) If J is a model of the bodies of r1 and r2, then p is false under J , and, since J is
a C-model of r1, some literal from H must be true under J . Consequently, either
both rJ1 and rJ2 are equal to ε and I is a C-model of both of them, or rJ1 and rJ2
only differ in the single extra atom p that rJ1 has in the head. However, since I is
a subset of J and p is false under J , p cannot be true under I , so I is either not a
C-model of any of rJ1 , rJ2 , or it is a C-model of both of them. In any case, 〈I, J〉 is
a SE-model of r1 if and only if it is an SE-model of r2.
Thus, we have proven that every SE-interpretation is an SE-model of r1 if and only if
it is an SE-model of r2. In other words, r1 and r2 are SE-equivalent. ⊓⊔
Lemma 24. Let H and B be sets of literals and p be an atom. Then rules of the follow-
ing forms are SE-equivalent:
H ;∼p← p,B. H ← p,B.
Proof. Let the first rule be denoted by r1 and the second by r2. Suppose 〈I, J〉 is some
SE-interpretation. If p is false under J , then J is a C-model of both r1 and r2. Further-
more, rJ1 is equal to ε and rJ2 is either equal to ε or its body contains p, and so is not
true under I . In any case, I is a C-model of both rJ1 and rJ2 , so 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model
of both r1 and r2.
On the other hand, if p is true under J , then J is a C-model of r1 if and only if it
is a C-model of r2 because the extra literal ∼a in the head of r1 cannot be satisfied.
Also, rJ1 is identical to rJ2 , so I is a C-model of rJ1 if and only if it is a C-model of rJ2 .
Consequently, 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r1 if and only if it is an SE-model of r2.
Thus, we have proven that every SE-interpretation is an SE-model of r1 if and only
if it is an SE-model of r2. In other words, r1 and r2 are SE-equivalent. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. Let H and B be sets of literals andL be a literal. Then rules of the following
forms are SE-equivalent:
H ;∼L← L,B. H ← L,B. (4)
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 23 and 24. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. Let H− be a set of negative literals, B be a set of literals and p be an atom.
Then rules of the following forms are SE-equivalent:
∼p;H− ← B. H− ← p,B.
Proof. Let the first rule be denoted by r1 and the second by r2. Suppose 〈I, J〉 is some
SE-interpretation. If p is false under J , then J is a C-model of both r1 and r2. Fur-
thermore, rJ1 is equal to ε and the body of rJ2 cannot be satisfied by I because I is a
subset of J and p is not in J . Thus, I is a C-model of both rJ1 and rJ2 , and 〈I, J〉 is an
SE-model of both r1 and r2.
On the other hand, if p is true under J , then we need to consider two cases:
a) If J is not a C-model of r1, then it also cannot be a C-model of r2 because, as can
easily be verified, r1 is C-equivalent to r2. Hence, 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of neither
r1 nor r2.
b) If J is a C-model of r1, then it must also be a C-model of r2 because r1 is C-equiv-
alent to r2. Furthermore, rJ1 and rJ2 are either both equal to ε, or their heads are
empty and rJ2 has the extra atom p in the body. In the latter case, if I were a model
of the body of rJ1 , then J would be a model of the body of r1 but not of its head
(which contains only negative literals), which contradicts the assumption that J is a
model of r1. Thus, I is not a model of the body of rJ1 , so it cannot be a model of the
body of rJ2 either. So I is a C-model of both rJ1 and rJ2 and 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model
of both r1 and r2.
Thus, we have proven that every SE-interpretation is an SE-model of r1 if and only if
it is an SE-model of r2. In other words, r1 and r2 are SE-equivalent. ⊓⊔
Theorem 7. Every rule r is SE-equivalent to the canonical rule can(r).
Proof. This can be shown by a careful iterative application of Lemmas 2 to 4. First
observe that if can(r) is equal to ε, then by Lemma 2 the rule r is indeed SE-equivalent
to ε.
In the principal case we can use Lemma 23 on all atoms shared between the positive
head and negative body of r and remove them one by one from the positive head of r
while preserving SE-equivalence. Similar situation occurs with atoms shared between
the negative head and positive body of r, which can be, according to Lemma 24, re-
moved from the negative head of r while preserving SE-equivalence. After these steps
are performed, we obtain the rule
(H(r)+ \B(r)−);∼(H(r)− \B(r)+) ← B(r)+,∼B(r)−. (5)
This is also the result of the defined transformation, unless the set H(r)+ \ B(r)− is
empty. In that case, one can repeatedly apply Lemma 4 to move the atoms from the
negative head of rule (5) into its positive body. In this case, the transformation returns
the canonical rule
← (B(r)+ ∪H(r)−),∼B(r)−. ⊓⊔
Lemma 8. Let r be a rule. An SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉 is not an SE-model of r if and
only if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. H(r)− ∪B(r)+ ⊆ J and J ⊆ L \B(r)−.
2. Either J ⊆ L \H(r)+ or both B(r)+ ⊆ I and I ⊆ L \H(r)+.
Proof. Suppose first that the above conditions hold. We will show that 〈I, J〉 is not an
SE-model of r. Due to the first condition, rJ is equal to H(r)+ ← B(r)+ and due
to the second condition, either J is not a C-model of r, or I contains the body of rJ
but does not contain any atom from its head, which means I is not a C-model of rJ .
Consequently, 〈I, J〉 is not an SE-model of r.
Now suppose I, J are two interpretations such that the above conditions do not hold.
We will show that 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r. We need to consider the following four
cases:
a) If J does not contain some atom from the negative head of r or it contains an atom
from the negative body of r, then J is a C-model of r and rJ is ε, so I is a C-model
of rJ . Consequently, 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r.
b) If J does not contain some atom from the positive body of r, then J is a C-model
of r and I is a C-model of rJ due to the fact that I is a subset of J . Consequently,
〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r.
c) If J contains an atom from the positive head of r and I does not include the positive
body of r, then J is a C-model of r and I is a C-model of rJ . Consequently, 〈I, J〉
is an SE-model of r.
d) If J contains some atom from the positive head of r and I also contains some atom
from the positive head of r, then J is a C-model of r and I is a C-model of rJ .
Consequently, 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r. ⊓⊔
Corollary 25. Let r be a canonical rule different from ε, put I = B(r)+, J = H(r)−∪
B(r)+ and J ′ = L \B(r)−, and let p be an atom. Then the following holds:
(1) The SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉 is not an SE-model of r.
(2) The SE-interpretation 〈I, J ∪ { p }〉 is an SE-model of r if and only if p belongs to
B(r)−.
(3) The SE-interpretation 〈I ∪ { p } , J ∪ { p }〉 is an SE-model of r if and only if p
belongs to H(r)+ ∪B(r)−.
(4) The SE-interpretation 〈I, J ′〉 is not an SE-model of r.
Proof. All parts of the Corollary easily follow from Lemma 8 and the disjointness prop-
erties satisfied by canonical rules. ⊓⊔
Lemma 26. Let r be a canonical rule different from ε and S be the set of SE-models
of r. An atom p belongs to B(r)− if and only if for all 〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE,
p ∈ J implies 〈I, J〉 ∈ S . (CB−)
Proof. Suppose p belongs to B(r)− and take some SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉 such that p
is in J . Then J is a C-model of r and rJ is equal to ε, so I is a C-model of rJ . Hence,
〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r, and since the choice of 〈I, J〉 was arbitrary, we conclude
that p satisfies condition (CB−).
Now let I0 = B(r)+ and J0 = H(r)−∪B(r)+ and suppose p is an atom satisfying
condition (CB−). Then the SE-interpretation 〈I0, J0 ∪ { p }〉 must belong to S and by
Corollary 25(2) we conclude that p belongs to B(r)−. ⊓⊔
Lemma 27. Let r be a canonical rule different from ε and S be the set of SE-models
of r. An atom p belongs to H(r)+ if and only if it does not belong to B(r)− and for all
〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE,
p ∈ I implies 〈I, J〉 ∈ S . (CH+ )
Proof. Suppose p belongs to H(r)+. Since r is a canonical rule, p does not belong to
B(r)−. Take some SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉 such that p belongs to I . Then p must also
belong to J , so J is a C-model of r and, for the same reason, I is a C-model of rJ .
Consequently, 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r. Since the choice of 〈I, J〉 was arbitrary, we
conclude that p satisfies condition (CH+ ).
Now let I0 = B(r)+ and J0 = H(r)−∪B(r)+ and suppose p is an atom satisfying
condition (CH+ ). Then the SE-interpretation 〈I0 ∪ { p } , J0 ∪ { p }〉 must belong to S
and by Corollary 25(3) we conclude that p belongs to H(r)+ ∪ B(r)−. Moreover, by
assumption we know that p does not belong to B(r)−, so it belongs to H(r)+. ⊓⊔
Lemma 9. An atom p belongs to B(r)− if and only if for all 〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE, the condition
(CB−) is satisfied.
An atom p belongs to H(r)+ if and only if it does not belong to B(r)− and for all
〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE, the condition (CH+ ) is satisfied.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 26 and 27.
Lemma 28. Let r be a canonical rule different from ε and S be the set of SE-models
of r. An atom p belongs to B(r)+ if and only if for all 〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE the following
conditions are satisfied:
p /∈ J implies 〈I, J〉 ∈ S ; (CH− )
J ∩H(r)+ 6= ∅ and p /∈ I implies 〈I, J〉 ∈ S . (CB+ )
Proof. Suppose p belongs to B(r)+ and take some SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉 such that p
is not in J . Since I is a subset of J , we obtain p is not in I either. Hence, J is a C-model
of r and I is a C-model of rJ and we conclude that 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r. The
choice of 〈I, J〉 was arbitrary, so this implies that condition (CH− ) is satisfied for p.
Now take some SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉 such that J ∩ H(r)+ 6= ∅ and p is not in
I . From the former it follows that J is a C-model of r and from the latter that I is a
C-model of rJ . Thus, 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r and since the choice of 〈I, J〉 was
arbitrary, we conclude that condition (CB+ ) holds for p.
For the converse implication, suppose p is an atom satisfying conditions (CH− ) and
(CB+ ). We consider two cases:
1. If H(r)+ is empty, then since r is canonical, we know that H(r)− is also empty.
So according to Corollary 25(1), the SE-interpretation 〈I0, J0〉, where I0 = J0 =
B(r)+, does not belong to S. Furthermore, by condition (CH− ) we can conclude
that 〈I0 \ { p } , J0 \ { p }〉 belongs to S. Thus, J0 must be different from J0 \{ p },
so p must belong to J0 = B(r)+.
2. If H(r)+ is nonempty, then it follows from Corollary 25(4) that the SE-interpre-
tation 〈I0, J0〉, where I0 = B(r)+ and J0 = L \ B(r)−, does not belong to S.
We can also conclude that J contains some atom from H(r)+ because, since r is
canonical, H(r)+ is disjoint from B(r)−. Thus, by condition (CB+ ) we conclude
that 〈I0 \ { p } , J0〉 belongs to S. Consequently, I0 must be different from I0\{ p },
so p belongs to I0 = B(r)+. ⊓⊔
Lemma 29. Let r be a canonical rule different from ε and S be the set of SE-models
of r.An atom p belongs to H(r)− if and only if it does not belong to B(r)+ and for all
〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE,
p /∈ J implies 〈I, J〉 ∈ S . (CH− )
Proof. Suppose p is some atom from H(r)− and take some SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉
such that p is not in J . Then J is a C-model of r and rJ is equal to ε so I is a C-model
of rJ . Consequently, 〈I, J〉 is an SE-model of r and since the choice of 〈I, J〉 was
arbitrary, we conclude that condition (CH− ) is satisfied for p.
Now let I0 = B(r)+ and J0 = H(r)− ∪B(r)+ and suppose p is an atom that does
not belong to B(r)+ and it satisfies condition (CH− ). Corollary 25(1) guarantees that
the SE-interpretation 〈I0, J0〉 is not an SE-model of r. Furthermore, from condition
(CH− ) we obtain that the SE-interpretation 〈I0 \ { p } , J0 \ { p }〉 belongs to S. Thus,
J0 must differ from J0 \ { p }, which implies that p belongs to J0. Furthermore, since
J0 = H(r)
− ∪ B(r)+ and p does not belong to B(r)+, we conclude that p belongs to
H(r)−. ⊓⊔
Lemma 10. An atom p belongs to B(r)+ if and only if for all 〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE, the condi-
tions (CH− ) and (CB+ ) are satisfied.
An atom p belongs to H(r)− if and only if it does not belong to B(r)+ and for all
〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE, the condition (CH− ) is satisfied.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas 28 and 29.
Theorem 12. For every canonical rule r, rule(modSE (r)) = r.
Proof. If r is equal to ε, then modSE (r) = ISE and by Definition 11, the rule rule(ISE)
is equal to ε so the identity is satisfied.
In the principal case, r is a canonical rule different from ε. Let S be the set of
SE-models of r. It follows from Definition 11 and Lemmas 26 to 29 that r = rule(S).
⊓⊔
Lemma 30. Let S be a set of SE-interpretations different from ISE. Then the sets of
H(S)+ ∪H(S)−, B(S)+ and B(S)− are pairwise disjoint.
Proof. Suppose that p is a member of both H(S)+∪H(S)− and B(S)+. Then, since p
is an S-positive-body atom, it cannot be an S-negative-head atom by definition. Thus,
p belongs to both H(S)+ and B(S)+. We will show that this is impossible given our
assumption that S is different from ISE. Take an arbitrary SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉. If
p belongs to I , then since p is an S-positive-head atom, 〈I, J〉 belongs to S. If p does
not belong to I but it belongs to J , then J contains the S-positive-head atom p, so since
p is an S-positive-body atom, 〈I, J〉 belongs to S. Finally, if p does not belong to J ,
then since p is an S-positive-body atom, 〈I, J〉 belongs to S. This means that S must
contain all SE-interpretations and is in conflict with our assumption.
Now suppose that p is a member of both H(S)+ ∪H(S)− and B(S)−. Then, since
p is an S-negative-body atom, it cannot be an S-positive-head atom by definition. Thus,
p belongs to both H(S)− and B(S)−. We will show that this is impossible given our
assumption that S is different from ISE. Take an arbitrary SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉. If
p belongs to J , then since p is an S-negative-body atom, 〈I, J〉 belongs to S. On the
other hand, if p does not belong to J , then since p is an S-negative-head atom, 〈I, J〉
belongs to S. This means that S must contain all SE-interpretations and is in conflict
with our assumption to the contrary.
Next, suppose that p is a member of both B(S)+ and B(S)−. By the same argu-
ments as in the previous case, this implies that S must be equal to ISE, contrary to the
assumption.
Lemma 31. For every set of SE-interpretations S, rule(S) is a canonical rule.
Proof. If S is equal to ISE, then rule(S) is equal to the canonical rule ε and the proof
is finished. Otherwise, rule(S) is of the form
H(S)+;∼H(S)− ← B(S)+,∼B(S)−.
To show that this rule is canonical, we need to prove that the following conditions are
satisfied:
1. The sets H(S)+ ∪H(S)−, B(S)+ and B(S)− are pairwise disjoint.
2. If H(S)+ is empty, then H(S)− is also empty.
The first condition follows from Lemma 30. To prove the second condition, suppose
H(S)+ is empty. Then by definition B(S)+ contains all atoms whose absence in J
implies that 〈I, J〉 belongs to S. By definition, then, H(S)− stays empty. ⊓⊔
Lemma 16. The set of all SE-models of a canonical rule r is the least among all sets
of SE-interpretations S such that rule(S) = r.
Proof. Let r be a canonical rule with the set of SE-models Sr. From Theorem 12
we know that rule(Sr) = r, so it remains to show that Sr is a subset of every set of
SE-interpretations S such that rule(S) = r. Take one such S. In case r is the canonical
tautology pε ← pε, it follows that H(S)+ = B(S)+ = { pε }. According to Lemma
30, this is possible only in case S = ISE = Sr, so it trivially holds that Sr is a subset
of S.
In the principal case, r is different from the canonical tautology, so S must be dif-
ferent from ISE and from rule(S) = r we obtain that H(r)+ = H(S)+, H(r)− =
H(S)−, B(r)+ = B(S)+ and B(r)− = B(S)−. Let 〈I, J〉 be an SE-model of r.
Then one of the conditions of Lemma 8 must be violated. We distinguish the following
four possible violations:
a) IfH(S)−∪B(S)+ * J , then J does not contain some atom fromH(S)−∪B(S)+.
From the definitions of S-negative-head atoms and S-positive-body atoms we then
obtain that 〈I, J〉 belongs to S.
b) If J * L \ B(S)−, then J contains some atom from B(S)−. From the definition
of S-negative-body atoms we then infer that 〈I, J〉 belongs to S.
c) If J * L \H(S)+ and B(S)+ * I , then J contains some atom from H(S)+ and
I does not contain some atom from B(S)+. By the definition of S-positive-body
atoms, 〈I, J〉 belongs to S.
d) If J * L \H(S)+ and I * L \H(S)+, then I contains some atom from H(S)+.
By the definition of S-positive-head atoms, 〈I, J〉 belongs to S. ⊓⊔
Proposition 32. A set of SE-interpretations S is rule-representable if and only if all
SE-interpretations from S are SE-models of rule(S).
Proof. If S is a rule-representable set of SE-interpretations, then there exists some rule
r such that S = modSE (r). Let r′ be the canonical rule can(r). According to Theorem
7, S = modSE (r′), and so Theorem 12 implies that rule(S) = rule(modSE (r′)) = r′.
Thus, all SE-interpretations from S are SE-models of rule(S).
On the other hand, if all SE-interpretations in S are SE-models of the rule r =
rule(S), then S is a subset of modSE (r). Also, by Lemma 31 it follows that r is
canonical and so Lemma 16 implies that modSE (r) is a subset of S. Consequently,
S = modSE (r). ⊓⊔
Proposition 33. A set of SE-interpretations S is rule-representable if and only if there
exist convex sublattices L1, L2 of 〈I,⊆〉 such that the complement of S relative to ISE
is equal to
{
〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE
∣∣ I ∈ L1 ∧ J ∈ L2
}
∪
{
〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE
∣∣ J ∈ L1 ∩ L2
}
.
Proof. Suppose that S is a rule-representable set of SE-interpretations. Then there ex-
ists some rule r such that S = modSE (r). Let the sets of interpretations L1, L2 be
defined as follows:
L1 =
{
I ∈ I
∣∣ B(r)+ ⊆ I ⊆ L \H(r)+
}
L2 =
{
J ∈ I
∣∣ H(r)− ∪B(r)+ ⊆ J ⊆ L \B(r)−
}
It can be straightforwardly verified that these sets are convex sublattices of 〈I,⊆〉.
It remains to prove that the complement of S relative to ISE is equal to the set of
SE-interpretations
{
〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE
∣∣ I ∈ L1 ∧ J ∈ L2
}
∪
{
〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE
∣∣ J ∈ L1 ∩ L2
}
. (6)
According to Lemma 8, an SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉 does not belong to S if and only if
these two conditions are satisfied:
1. H(r)− ∪B(r)+ ⊆ J and J ⊆ L \B(r)−.
2. Either J ⊆ L \H(r)+ or both B(r)+ ⊆ I and I ⊆ L \H(r)+.
It is not difficult to see that whenever the first condition and first disjunct of the second
condition are satisfied, 〈I, J〉 belongs to the second part of the set (6). Similarly, the first
condition together with the second disjunct of the second condition imply that 〈I, J〉
belongs to the first part of the set (6). Conversely, given the definitions of L1 and L2, it
is easy to see that any SE-interpretation belonging to the set (6) satisfies the conditions
of Lemma 8. Thus, the set (6) coincides with the complement of S relative to ISE.
Now suppose that L1, L2 are two convex sublattices of 〈I,⊆〉 such that the com-
plement of S relative to ISE is equal to the set (6). Let ⊤1, ⊥1 be the top and bottom
elements of L1 and⊤2,⊥2 be the top and bottom elements of L2. Furthermore, let r be
a rule of the form
H+;∼H− ← B+,∼B−.
where H+ = L \ ⊤1, H− = ⊥2, B+ = ⊥1 and B− = L \ ⊤2. We will show that
S = modSE (r).
Suppose first that the SE-interpretation 〈I, J〉 is not an SE-model of r. Then, by
Lemma 8, J includesH−∪B+ = ⊥2∪⊥1 and J is included inL\B− = L\(L\⊤2) =
⊤2. By convexity of L2 we now obtain that J belongs to L2. Lemma 8 also implies that
either J is included in L \ H+ = ⊤1, or I includes B+ = ⊥1 and is included in
L \H+ = ⊤1. The convexity of L1 now implies that in the former case J belongs to
L1, while in the latter case I belongs L1. In any of these cases, 〈I, J〉 is a member of
the set (6).
Now let 〈I, J〉 be some SE-interpretation not belonging to S. If 〈I, J〉 belongs to
the first part of the set (6), then ⊥1 ⊆ I ⊆ ⊤1 and ⊥2 ⊆ J ⊆ ⊤2. Thus, I includes
B+ and is included in L \ H+, and J includes H− and is included in L \ B−. Also,
since I is a subset of J , J includes B+. Lemma 8 then implies that 〈I, J〉 is not an
SE-model of r. If 〈I, J〉 belongs to the second part of the set (6), then ⊥1 ⊆ J ⊆ ⊤1
and ⊥1 ⊆ J ⊆ ⊤2. Thus, J includes both H− and B+ and is included in L \ B− and
in L \H+. As a consequence of Lemma 8, 〈I, J〉 is not an SE-model of r. ⊓⊔
Theorem 17. Let S be a set of SE-interpretations. Then the following conditions are
equivalent:
1. The set of SE-interpretations S is rule-representable.
2. All SE-interpretations from S are SE-models of rule(S).
3. There exist convex sublattices L1, L2 of 〈I,⊆〉 such that the complement of S rel-
ative to ISE is equal to
{
〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE
∣∣ I ∈ L1 ∧ J ∈ L2
}
∪
{
〈I, J〉 ∈ ISE
∣∣ J ∈ L1 ∩ L2
}
.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 32 and 33. ⊓⊔
Theorem 22. SU-equivalence is stronger than SR-equivalence, which itself is stronger
than SMR-equivalence, which in turn is stronger than strong equivalence. That is,
≡SU≻≡SR≻≡SMR≻≡S .
Proof. We first need to show that if two programs are SU-equivalent, they are also
SR-equivalent, but the converse does not hold. Suppose P1, P2 are SU-equivalent pro-
grams. Then, according to Theorem 4.3 in [2], their symmetric difference (P1 \ P2) ∪
(P2 \ P1) contains only SE-tautological rules.2 To show that P1 is SR-equivalent to
P2, suppose S is a set of SE-interpretations belonging to the set
{modSE (r) | r ∈ P1 ∪ { ε } } . (7)
Then there exists some rule r with S = modSE (r) that either belongs to P1, or is
SE-tautological. Furthermore, P1 = (P1 ∩ P2) ∪ (P1 \ P2), so r either belongs to
P2, or it belongs to P1 \ P2, or it is SE-tautological. But all rules from P1 \ P2 are
SE-tautological, so we can conclude that r either belongs to P2 or it is SE-tautological.
Consequently, S belongs to the set
{modSE (r) | r ∈ P2 ∪ { ε } } . (8)
A similar argument yields that the set (8) is a subset of the set (7). Consequently, the
two sets are equal, so P1 is SR-equivalent to P2.
To see that the converse does not hold, take the programs P1 = {∼p← . } and
P2 = {← p. }. It can be easily verified that they are SR-equivalent, but since their sym-
metric difference contains rules that are not SE-tautological, they are not SU-equivalent
(according to Theorem 4.3 in [2]).
Next, need to show that if two programs are SR-equivalent, they are also
SMR-equivalent, but the converse does not hold. It can be immediately seen that
{modSE (r) | r ∈ P1 ∪ { ε } } = {modSE (r) | r ∈ P2 ∪ { ε } }
implies
min {modSE (r) | r ∈ P1 ∪ { ε } } = min {modSE (r) | r ∈ P2 ∪ { ε } } ,
2 The Theorem actually states that the symmetric difference contains only valid rules. A rule is
valid, as defined in [2], if and only if it is SE-tautological.
so the first part of the proof is finished. As for the second part, it suffices to consider
programs P1 = { p. } and P2 = { p., p← q. } which are SMR-equivalent, but not
SR-equivalent.
Finally, we need to prove that if two programs are SMR-equivalent, they are also
strongly equivalent, but not vice versa. So take some SMR-equivalent programs P1,
P2. Then
min {modSE (r) | r ∈ P1 ∪ { ε } } = min {modSE (r) | r ∈ P2 ∪ { ε } } . (9)
Furthermore,
modSE (P1) =
⋂
{modSE (r) | r ∈ P1 }
=
⋂(
{modSE (r) | r ∈ P1 } ∪
{
ISE
})
=
⋂
{modSE (r) | r ∈ P1 ∪ { ε } } ,
and whenever some set of SE-interpretations S is non-minimal within
{modSE (r) | r ∈ P1 ∪ { ε } } , (10)
there exists some set of SE-interpretations T from (10) such that T ( S. Thus, T ∩S =
T , and so such non-minimal sets are irrelevant when determining the intersection of all
sets in the set (10). Consequently,
modSE (P1) =
⋂
min {modSE (r) | r ∈ P1 ∪ { ε } } .
By similar arguments we obtain that
modSE (P2) =
⋂
min {modSE (r) | r ∈ P2 ∪ { ε } } .
Thus, (9) implies that P1 is strongly equivalent to P2.
To see that the converse does not hold, consider programs P1 = { p., q. } and P2 =
{ p← q., q. }, which are strongly equivalent, but not SMR-equivalent. ⊓⊔
Proposition 34. If S1,S2 are rule-representable sets of SE-models, then S1 ∪ S2 is
also rule-representable.
Proof. Let LI1, LJ1 , LI2, LJ2 be convex sublattices of 〈I,⊆〉 such that
S1 =
{
〈I, J〉
∣∣ I ∈ LI1 ∧ J ∈ LJ1
}
∪
{
〈I, J〉
∣∣ J ∈ LI1 ∩ LJ1
}
,
S2 =
{
〈I, J〉
∣∣ I ∈ LI2 ∧ J ∈ LJ2
}
∪
{
〈I, J〉
∣∣ J ∈ LI2 ∩ LJ2
}
.
Furthermore, let S = S1 ∩ S2 and
LI = { I | (∃J ∈ I)(〈J, J〉 /∈ S1 ∩ S2 ∧ 〈I, J〉 ∈ S1 ∩ S2 }
LJ = { J | (∃I ∈ I)(〈I, J〉 ∈ S1 ∩ S2 }
We need to prove that LI , LJ are convex sublattices of 〈I,⊆〉 and that
S =
{
〈I, J〉
∣∣ I ∈ LI ∧ J ∈ LJ
}
∪
{
〈I, J〉
∣∣ J ∈ LI ∩ LJ
}
.
